

Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 RSC-01 DRC-01 SS-20 SSO-00 CCO-00 ISO-00

EURE-00 PM-07 NSC-10 SPC-03 L-03 NSCE-00 NEA-10

CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 INRE-00 ACDA-19 TRSE-00 EB-11

IO-14 SAJ-01 PRS-01 OMB-01 OIC-04 /142 W

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O R 121728Z DEC 73

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6386

SECDEF IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

UFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0297

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USMISSION GENEVA

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SECTO 62

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP, PFOR, NATO

SUBJECT: NATO MINISTERIAL: AFTERNOON SESSION, DECEMBER 10

BEGIN SUMMARY: AFTER THE SECRETARY'S STATEMENT (SEPTTEL), THE REMAINDER OF THE AFTERNOON SESSION WAS DOMINATED BY THE FRENCH PRESENTATION. THERE WAS A SHARP EXCHANGE BETWEEN THE SECRETARY AND FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER JOBERT ON SUBJECT OF FRENCH MISINTERPRETATIONS OF THE US-USSR AGREEMENT ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR. ONLY OTHER PRESENTATIONS WERE THAT BY LUXEMBOURG AND THAT BY GREECE WHICH INCLUDED A MODERATE AND UNEMOTIONAL RESPONSE TO THOSE ALLIES WHO HAD COMMENTED ON GREEK POLITICS. END SUMMARY

1. LUXEMBOURG (THORN) REVIEWED THE HISTORY OF THE ALLIANCE, THE U.S. CHALLENGE OF RENEWAL, AND THE PROGRESS TO DATE ON A NEW DECLARATION. THORN PRAISED FRENCH DRAFT AS GIVING PROPER PERSPECTIVE TO EUROPE IN EAST-WEST FOCUS, NOTING HOWEVER THAT EUROPE IS NOT YET SUFFICIENTLY WELL ORGANIZED POLITICALLY AND MILITARILY. . IN SPEAKING OF SPIRIT OF THE ALLIANCE HE REFERRED TO EUROPE'S "PARTNERS" ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE ATLANTIC.

2. IN REFERENCE TO GREEK POLITICS THORN SUGGESTED ALLIES SHOULD NOT LIMIT THEMSELVES TO RECALLING PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM BUT SHOULD SEE TO IT THAT THEY ARE ADHERED TO. ON CSCE, NOTING THAT EAST AND WEST HAVE SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES, HE SAID ALLIES SHOULD PROCEED SO THAT PUBLIC OPINION WOULD KNOW WHAT WAS BEING ACHIEVED AND WHAT COUNTRIES WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THINGS NOT ACHIEVED. ON MBFR, HE SAID THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE FORCE REDUCTIONS SHOULD IN NO CASE BE CARRIED OUT IN A MANNER THAT WOULD PREVENT EC-9 FROM THEMSELVES BEING MASTERS OF THEIR OWN DEFENSE IN THE LONG TERM.

3. HE TOUCHED LIGHTLY ON MIDDLE EAST SAYING THE US SHOULD CONSULT WITH THE ALLIES ON IMPORTANT MATTERS BEFOREHAND AND NOT MERELY REPORT DEVELOPMENTS TO THEM AFTERWARDS. HOWEVER, HE FELT THERE WAS NO BENEFIT IN
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RECRIMINATIONS. ALLIES SHOULD LOOK TO THE FUTURE AND IMPROVE ON CONSULTATION. IN CONCLUSION THORN SAID ALLIED INTERESTS ARE INDIVISIBLE AND THE PAST IS THE BEST GUARANTEE FOR THE FUTURE. HE EXPRESSED GRATITUDE FOR SPECIFIC PROPOSALS MADE BY THE SECRETARY AND SAID ALL SHOULD THINK ABOUT THESE PROBLEMS.

4. GREECE (TETENES) DEVOTED PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO

ATLANTIC RELATIONS. TETENES SPOKE OF THE URGENCY OF THE TASK BEFORE THE ALLIES AND PRAISED PROGRESS TO DATE ON DRAFT OF L5. ON NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA AND GENEVA HE REGRETTED SOME RECENT MBFR TEXTS OMIT MENTION OF ASSOCIATED MEASURES, AND HE EXPRESSED GUARDED HOPE THAT IN CSCE EAST WAS NOW READY TO MOVE AHEAD, ESPECIALLY ON CBM'S. DESPITE AFFIRMATIVE ASPECTS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS TETENES WARNED AGAINST RELAXATION OF VIGILANCE.

5. RESPONDING TO REMARKS ON DEMOCRACY IN GREECE, TETENES ASSOCIATED HIMSELF WITH THOSE WHO PAID TRIBUTE TO DEMOCRACY AS AN OBJECTIVE OF ALL GOVERNMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE. HOWEVER, GOVERNMENTS HAD TO ADDRESS PROBLEMS AND PROBLEM IN GREECE WAS WEAKNESS,

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INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
UFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0298
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK
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VICE, AND FAILINGS IN THE PURSUIT OF DEMOCRACY. THE GREEK GOVERNMENT IS TRYING TO REMEDY THESE ILLNESSES, HE SAID. TETENES REFERRED TO TRADITIONS OF SOLIDARITY
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IN THE ALLIANCE AND CHARACTERIZED DIRECT REFERENCES TO INTERNAL GREEK POLITICS AS "FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS" OF DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF MEMBERS. HE OBSERVED THAT OPINIONS WHICH HAD BEEN EXPRESSED SEEMED TO BE BASED ON DISTORTED INFORMATION ABOUT EVENTS WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE.

6. TETENES REGRETTED REPERCUSSIONS OF THE CRISIS ON ALLIANCE. HE SAID GREECE MAINTAINS FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH ALL NATIONS IN THE AREA AND HAS SPECIAL UNDERSTANDING FOR THE ARAB PROBLEMS.

7. JOBERT (FRANCE) TOOK AS POINT OF DEPARTURE MINISTERIAL IN COPENHAGEN SIX MONTHS AGO, AND HE RECOUNTED EVENTS WHICH HAVE TRANSPIRED SINCE THEN. PRAISING FRANCE'S PERCEPTION OF THE "PROFOUND MODIFICATIONS" IN THE RELATIONS AMONG THE ALLIES, HE SAID THAT FRANCE SUBMITTED A TEXT FOR THE ATLANTIC DECLARATION WHICH TOOK THOSE MODIFICATIONS FULLY INTO ACCOUNT. JOBERT SAID THOSE EFFORTS HAVE NOT BEEN FUTILE. ESPECIALLY THESE LAST FEW WEEKS, THE FRENCH DRAFT HAS RECEIVED VERY FAVORABLE RECEPTION IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL.

8. JOBERT THEN MADE REFERENCE TO TWO EVENTS - THE SOVIET-US AGREEMENT ON JUNE 22, 1973 AND THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT THIS AUTUMN. HE SAID THE LATTER WAS THE FIRST CASE IN WHICH THE FORMER HAD TO BE APPLIED.

9. THE JUNE 22 AGREEMENT, JOBERT SAID, WAS OF GREAT CONCERN TO MOST OF THE COUNTRIES REPRESENTED IN THE COUNCIL. ONLY ONE WEEK AFTER THE COPENHAGEN COMMUNIQUE IN WHICH THE ALLIES "REAFFIRMED THE PRINCIPLES AND

OBJECTIVES OF THE ALLIANCE", THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION AGREED BETWEEN THEMSELVES TO CONCERT THEIR ACTION IN CRISIS SITUATIONS. HE RECOGNIZED THAT TECHNICAL TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE LAST QUARTER CENTURY, SPECIFICALLY THOSE WHICH RESULTED IN NUCLEAR PARITY, NATURALLY LED TO SOME FORM OF AGREEMENT TO PREVENT NUCLEAR CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TWO BIG POWERS, BUT HE ASKED RHETORICALLY, WHETHER IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THIS COOPERATION BETWEEN TWO "ADVERSARY-PARTNERS" AUTOMATICALLY TO
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TAKE PRIORITY OVER CONSULTATION WITHIN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. WAS IT NOT NECESSARY FOR THE DETENTE WHICH THE ALLIES HAD STRUGGLED FOR BILATERALLY AND MULTILATERALLY TO TAKE PRECEDENCE?

10. JOBERT TURNED TO DISCUSSION OF THE MIDDLE EAST. HE SAID TIME DID NOT PERMIT ATTENTION TO THE BASIC ISSUES OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT ITSELF - IT WAS SUFFICIENT TO NOTE THAT THE DISPUTE WAS OUTSIDE THE AREA OF APPLICATION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY AND DID NOT CONCERN THE ALLIANCE DIRECTLY. CITING ARTICLE 4 OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY, JOBERT RECALLED THAT ON OCTOBER 16 THE US ASKED ITS ALLIES TO UNDERTAKE REPRESENTATIONS TO THE SOVIET UNION ABOUT THE LATTER'S CONDUCT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND TO DO SO IN COMPLETE IGNORANCE OF THE CONTENT OF EXCHANGES WHICH HAD RECENTLY TAKEN PLACE BETWEEN THE US AND THE USSR. JOBERT OPINED THE US REPRESENTATIVE SURELY COULD NOT HAVE EXPECTED ANYTHING ELSE BUT A NEGATIVE REPLY TO SUCH A REQUEST. HE WONDERED HOW THE US COULD EXPECT THE ALLIES TO PUT INTO JEOPARDY THE DETENTE THAT THEY HAD ACHIEVED WITH THE USSR FOR A CONFLICT THE SCOPE OF WHICH WAS DECIDED WITHOUT THEM.

11. WITH REGARD TO THE ALERT OF OCTOBER 24-25, FRANCE RECOGNIZED THAT IT WAS A MATTER IN WHICH MINUTES COUNTED. NEVERTHELESS, IT TOOK THE EUROPEANS BY SURPRISE EVEN THOUGH THE TROOPS WERE ONES WHICH WERE AVAILABLE TO NATO, AND IT PUT THE ALLIES INTO A SITUATION WHERE THEY WERE "REDUCED TO ACCEPTING THE RISKS OF THE SITUATION WITH THEIR EYES CLOSED." JOBERT WENT ON TO DEFINE CONSULTATION AS FRANCE UNDERSTOOD THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY SAYING THAT IT REQUIRED NOT ONLY GIVING PRIOR INFORMATION BUT ALSO OBTAINING VIEWS OF OTHERS BEFORE EMBARKING ON A COURSE OF ACTION. HE DISTINGUISHED BETWEEN CRISES THAT DID NOT CONCERN THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY AREA DIRECTLY AND THOSE WHICH DID. THE US, HE SAID, SHOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE "JOLTS OF OCTOBER". THESE EVENTS MAKE NECESSARY THE PROCESS OF REFLECTION DECIDED UPON LAST JUNE.

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INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

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AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

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AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY OSLO

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UFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0299

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12. JOBERT WENT ON TO SAY THIS "EXERCISE" SHOULD
RESPOND TO TWO NEEDS: 1) THE NEED TO EXAMINE THE

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ATLANTIC ALLIANCE ON BOTH POLITICAL AND DEFENSE PLANES.
REFERRING BACK TO THE LANGUAGE OF THE JUNE MINISTERIAL
COMMUNIQUE JOBERT SAID "THIS NEED WHICH WAS FELT BY THE
US BEFORE ITS JUNE 22 AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIETS CON-
TINUED TO BE FELT BY THE REST OF THE ALLIES EVEN AFTER
THAT DATE." AND, 2) ASSURING THE FUTURE OF OUR ALLIANCE
BY SPECIFYING ITS AIMS AND UNDERTAKINGS, IN THE LIGHT OF
NEW FACTS.

13. JOBERT SAID THAT AS A RESULT OF THE JUNE 22 AGREE-
MENT EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION QUESTIONED THE VALUE OF
THE AMERICAN NUCLEAR COMMITMENT, AND THE PERMANENCE
OF US FORCES IN EUROPE. ON THE OTHER HAND AMERICAN PUB-
LIC OPINION INQUIRES ABOUT THE WILL AND CAPACITY OF
EUROPEANS TO AUGMENT THEIR DEFENSE EFFORT. WE SHOULD
REPLY TO THOSE QUESTIONS FROM BOTH SIDES. JOBERT THOUGHT
LISTING CERTAIN FACTS AS THEY APPEAR IN THE FRENCH
DRAFT DECLARATION WOULD HELP RESPOND TO THESE QUESTIONS:

A) PRESENTLY NO ALTERNATIVE TO US NUCLEAR UMBRELLA,
B) US FORCES IN EUROPE PLAY AN IRREPLACEABLE ROLE IN
DEFENSE OF EUROPE AND THE US, C) THE PROBLEM OF THE
DEFENSE OF EUROPE BECOMES MORE SPECIFIC AS A RESULT
OF TECHNOLOGICAL EVOLUTION, D) AT PRESENT BRITISH
AND FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES REINFORCE THE ALLIANCE BY
PLAYING THEIR OWN DETERRENT ROLE, E) A EUROPE IN CON-
TROL OF ITS OWN DESTINY MUST HAVE ITS OWN DEFENSIVE
CAPABILITY.

14. THUS, HE SAID, THE UNDERTAKING BY THE US AND
THE ABOVE VIEWS OF THE EUROPEAN ALLIES RUN PARALLEL
TO EACH OTHER. ALL OF THIS, HE SAID, IS SPELLED OUT
IN THE FRENCH DRAFT IN ATLANTIC RELATIONS. HE IN-
DICATED THE VIEWS OF OTHERS ON THAT DRAFT HAVE BEEN
NOTED AND FRANCE HAS AGREED TO RECAST IT AND SUPPLE-
MENT IT SO AS TO REFLECT THOSE VIEWS. HE HOPED THE
WORK OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES WILL REACH
"SUCCESS" SOON.

15. JOBERT TURNED TO MBFR AND SAID "QUITE FRANKLY,
IT WORRIES US." WHILE THE WARSAW PACT IS IN THE PROCESS

OF STRENGTHENING ITS FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, THE

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ALLIES SEEM BENT ON EXACERBATING THE ALREADY EXISTING IMBALANCE THROUGH MBFR. HE EXPRESSED PARTICULAR CONCERN OVER PHASE II WHICH WOULD INVOLVE THE REDUCTIONS IN THE DEFENSE EFFORTS OF WEST EUROPEAN ALLIES THEMSELVES. ALL OF THIS HE SAID RUNS THE RISK OF MORTGAGING, IN A POLITICAL AND LEGAL SENSE, THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF EUROPE AT A TIME WHEN IT IS TRYING TO FIND ITS IDENTITY. "IT'S NECESSARY TO KEEP AN INDISPENSABLE COHERENCE BETWEEN WHAT YOU DO IN VIENNA AND WHAT WE SAY HERE."

16. IF, JOBERT ASKED, WE WANT TO PLACE EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN A NEW LIGHT, EACH COUNTRY MUST TAKE PART. FRANCE HAS A DOUBLE AMBITION: AN EFFECTIVE DEFENSE IN THE SERVICE OF A TRUE DETENTE. SHE BELIEVES THIS SEARCH SHOULD BE ALONG MANY PATHS AND AT PRESENT CSCE REPRESENTS ONE OF THOSE PATHS. FRANCE LOOKS FOR REAL SUCCESS IN CSCE AND TO THIS END HAS SET FORTH ITS OBJECTIVES WITHOUT ILLUSIONS. SIMPLY STATED, THESE ARE THAT EVERY COUNTRY SHOULD AT THE SAME TIME ACQUIRE GREATER SECURITY AND GREATER LIBERTY. THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER EXPOUNDED IN SOME DETAIL AND WITH NOTABLE CAUTION ON FRENCH VIEWS OF CSCE. HE NOTED THAT RESULTS WOULD PROBABLY REFLECT ONLY HOPES WITH BASIC CHANGES TO BE PROVED ONLY BY FUTURE EVENTS. FOR THESE REASONS JOBERT DID NOT THINK IT WISE TO HOLD THE FINAL PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE AT CHIEFS OF STATE OR HEADS OF GOVERNMENT LEVEL.

17. THE SECRETARY THEN SAID: BEGIN QUOTE

I WILL NOT USE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO REPLY TO POINTS OF INTERPRETATION THAT WERE RAISED BY MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE SINCE WE HAVE A RESTRICTED MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS WHERE WE WILL HAVE AN OCCASION TO DO THIS. BUT THERE IS AN IMPORTANT MISINTERPRETATION OF FACT THAT HAS BEEN REPEATED SO CONSISTENTLY, AND SO PUBLICLY, AND WHICH IS OF SUCH CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO THE ALLIANCE THAT I MUST USE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO CORRECT IT IN FRONT OF ALL OF THOSE WHO HAVE HEARD IT.

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AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

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THIS MISINTERPRETATION CONCERNS THE AGREEMENT ON
THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR OF JUNE 22, 1973. BOTH
THE PRESIDENT AND I MET WITH THE NATO COUNCIL, INCLUDING
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THE FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE AND EXPLAINED IN GREAT DETAIL
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS AGREEMENT AND IT IS BEYOND OUR

UNDERSTANDING WHY IT SHOULD BE IN THE INTEREST OF THE ALLIANCE TO MAKE AN INTERPRETATION THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS NEVER MADE AND THAT WERE THE SOVIET UNION TO MAKE IT WE WOULD INSTANTLY REJECT. LET ME THEREFORE, FOR THE RECORD, REPEAT THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT: ARTICLE 1 STATES THAT IT IS AN OBJECTIVE, NOT AN OBLIGATION, OF THE POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION TO REMOVE THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR AND THAT THEREFORE THE PARTIES WILL ACT IN SUCH A MANNER TO PREVENT THE DEVELOPMENT OF SITUATIONS CAPABLE OF CAUSING A DANGEROUS EXACERBATION OF RELATIONS, TO AVOID MILITARY CONFRONTATIONS AND TO EXCLUDE THE OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR. ARTICLE 2 EXPLAINS WHAT THAT MEANS AND IT EXPLAINS THAT IN ORDER TO REALIZE THE OBJECTIVE - NOT THE OBLIGATION, BUT THE OBJECTIVE - STATED IN ARTICLE 1: THE PARTIES WILL REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE OTHER PARTY, AGAINST THE ALLIES OF THE OTHER PARTY, AND AGAINST OTHER COUNTRIES, IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH MAY ENDANGER INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

IN OTHER WORDS, FAR FROM DECOUPLING CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR WAR, ARTICLES 1 AND 2, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN A FORMAL INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENT, HAS SAID THAT NUCLEAR WAR CAN BE PREVENTED ONLY IF THERE IS NO CONVENTIONAL WAR; SECONDLY, FAR FROM SINGLING OUT THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION FOR SPECIAL CONSIDERATION, EVERY OBLIGATION, SUCH AS IT EXISTS IN THIS AGREEMENT IS APPLIED, NOT ONLY TO THE UNITED STATES AND TO THE SOVIET UNION BUT TO ALL OTHER COUNTRIES, TO THE ALLIES OF THE OTHER PARTY AND AGAINST ALL OTHER COUNTRIES. ARTICLE 4, THE REQUIREMENT FOR CONSULTATION, SIMILARLY APPLIES TO SITUATIONS THREATENING THE SECURITY OF ALL OTHER COUNTRIES AND DOES NOT HAVE TO BE INVOKED BY THE UNITED STATES IN ORDER TO OBTAIN A CONSULTATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION. IT CAN BE INVOKED IF THE SOVIET UNION THREATENS TO INVADE SOME OTHER TERRITORY NOT COVERED BY THE ALLIANCE.

AND FINALLY, ARTICLE 6 SPECIFICALLY, OMITTS OBLIGATIONS TOWARDS ALLIES FROM WHATEVER OBLIGATIONS EXIST IN THIS AGREEMENT SO THERE IS THE SAFEGUARD
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OF THE SPECIFIC COUPLING OF CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR WAR, THE SAFEGUARD OF A SPECIFIC OBLIGATION TO CONSULT BEFORE ANY THIRD COUNTRIES ARE ATTACKED AND A SPECIFIC OBLIGATION, A SPECIFIC REQUIREMENT WITH RESPECT TO ALLIES. IT DOES NOT NEGATE THE NUCLEAR GUARANTEE, IT CONFIRMS THE NUCLEAR GUARANTEE. IT IS INTENDED AS A RESTRAINT ON IRRESPONSIBLE SOVIET BEHAVIOUR. IT IS ALSO NOT A FACT THAT THE UNITED STATES INVOKED ARTICLE 4 OF THIS TREATY, NAMELY THE CONSULTATION CLAUSE, IN THE

RECENT CRISIS. THE UNITED STATES INVOKED ARTICLE 2
IN THE RECENT CRISIS - THAT IS TO SAY THE UNITED STATES
POINTED OUT THAT A SOVIET CONVENTIONAL MOVE IN THE
MIDDLE EAST MIGHT HAVE NUCLEAR CONSEQUENCES. THEREFORE,
I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS, SINCE THE ALLIANCE DEPENDS ON
IT, THAT THE INTERPRETATION THAT WAS GIVEN PUBLICLY
AND IN THIS SESSION IS ENTIRELY ERRONEOUS AND I HAVE
TAKEN THE LIBERTY, MR. SECRETARY GENERAL, OF ASKING FOR
THE FLOOR, TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO ALL MY COLLEAGUES THAT
IF THIS INTERPRETATION CONTINUES TO BE REPEATED IT
CANNOT BE INADVERTENT.
END QUOTE

18. TO THIS JOBERT REPLIED: BEGIN QUOTE

I HAVE LISTENED CAREFULLY TO MR. KISSINGER'S
INTERPRETATION OF THIS AGREEMENT BETWEEN RUSSIA AND
HIS COUNTRY. I HAVE GIVEN OUR INTERPRETATION AND WE
WILL SEE WHICH INTERPRETATION THE FACTS GIVE TO THIS
AGREEMENT. I WILL ADMIT MY ERROR IF I HAVE BEEN WRONG
IN MY INTERPRETATION.
END QUOTE

19. THE AFTERNOON SESSION CONCLUDED WITH THIS EXCHANGE
AND THE COUNCIL RECONVENED IN RESTRICTED SESSION A FEW
MINUTES LATER.

KISSINGER

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Message Attributes

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Draft Date: 12 DEC 1973
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Disposition Approved on Date:
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Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
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